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AbsTrACT
The 2016 Iraq Inquiry Report (the Chilcot report) was highly critical of the British 
government and its involvement in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and subsequent occu-
pation. Drawing upon the authoritative material in the report, this article provides 
the most comprehensive and conceptually grounded post-Chilcot assessment of the 
empirical evidence now available regarding whether deception and propaganda were 
used to mobilize support for the invasion of Iraq. Employing a conceptual frame-
work designed to identify deceptive organized persuasive communication (OPC), it 
is argued that the Chilcot report supports the thesis that, through distortions and 
omissions, deceptive OPC campaigns presented a misleading impression of both 
the threat posed by Iraqi WMD and Britain’s commitment to a peaceful resolu-
tion via the ‘UN route’. Moreover, based upon UK-US communications in the 
immediate aftermath of 9/11, the Chilcot report also provides suggestive but highly 
significant evidence of a broader and covert geo-strategic policy, including action 
against Syria and Iran, and which was underpinned by a ‘close knit propaganda 
campaign’. In light of this, it is argued that a major expansion of scholarly inquiry 
is necessary involving sustained analysis of the establishing phase of the ‘War on 
Terror’, the role that deception and propaganda might have played with respect to 
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its enablement, and, more broadly, the implications of this for our understanding of 
propaganda and deception in liberal democratic states.
The long-awaited Iraq Inquiry Report (2016), more often referred to as the 
‘Chilcot report’, into UK involvement with the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 
ensuing war and subsequent occupation was finally published on 6 July 2016. 
It was widely viewed as offering a highly critical appraisal of the way in which 
the UK government and military had conducted themselves and, in particular, 
delivered significant criticisms of British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Chilcot 
made clear that the war was not one of last resort, that more time should have 
been given to weapons inspectors, that the way in which the legal basis for 
war had been established was far from satisfactory, and that Blair had failed 
to engage fully his cabinet and other officials during the decision-making 
process. It seems inevitable that criticisms and condemnations of Blair will 
harden further over time.
This article explores three interrelated issues concerning deception and 
organized persuasive communication (OPC), all of which have been prominent 
parts of the controversies regarding both the Iraq War and western foreign 
policy throughout the post 9/11 ‘War on Terror’. Information in the Chilcot 
report speaks directly to these three issues which are: (1) the apparent misuse 
of intelligence regarding Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 
especially during the production of the UK government’s Iraq Dossier published 
in September 2002 (UK government 2002); (2) UK government claims to have 
been genuinely seeking a peaceful resolution through UN-based inspections 
and disarmament in the run-up to the invasion which might have allowed 
Saddam’s regime to remain, and (3) broader questions surrounding the ‘War 
on Terror’, its underlying purpose, and the roles of deception and propaganda. 
Regarding issues (1) and (2), two earlier studies (Herring and Robinson 2014a 
and 2014b) explored the role of deception based upon evidence available prior 
to publication of the final Chilcot report. Building upon these earlier studies, 
this paper provides the most comprehensive and conceptually grounded post-
Chilcot assessment of the empirical evidence to date, providing an authorita-
tive assessment of earlier hypotheses and identifying limitations in the Chilcot 
report itself. As we shall see, much of the Inquiry Report either confirms (in 
the case of deception over WMD) or strengthens (in the case of the UN route/
regime change deception) existing hypotheses, although important ques-
tions are raised regarding the extent to which Chilcot appears to have avoided 
reaching more critical conclusions about the honesty and probity of the officials 
involved. Of even greater importance, however, is the information presented 
by the Chilcot report with respect to the wider ‘War on Terror’. As we shall 
see, Chilcot provides important preliminary but highly significant indications 
suggesting that official deception and propaganda extend well beyond the 
specifics of WMD intelligence and ‘the UN route’ to include a broader propa-
gandistic OPC campaign based upon exploiting the ‘War on Terror’ in order to 
pursue, through aggressive wars, geopolitical goals. This finding, it is argued, 
demands a major expansion of scholarly inquiry to now investigate the forma-
tive stages of the ‘war on terror’ and the role that deception and propaganda 
might have played with respect to its establishment.
This article starts in Section One by reviewing key debates over Iraq, 
deception, OPC and propaganda. The existing state of knowledge regarding 
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deception over WMD and the UN route is described before detailing the 
concepts of non-deceptive and deceptive OPC and their relationship to propa-
ganda. The research approach and methods are also set out. Section Two eval-
uates official claims regarding Iraq’s WMD (with particular reference to the 
UK government’s Iraq Dossier) and the UN route deception through a review 
of the Chilcot report findings. Section Three addresses new information 
concerning both the origins of the 2003 Iraq War in the immediate aftermath 
of 9/11, and ‘phases 1 and 2’ of the ‘War on Terror’. The article concludes with 
a discussion of the implications of these arguments with respect to the role of 
deception and propagandistic OPC in western society, our understanding of 
the ‘War on Terror’, and the research questions which now need addressing.
seCTion one: exisTing CLAims And CounTer CLAims: 
wmd, The un rouTe And The quesTion of deCePTive And 
ProPAgAndisTiC oPC
The controversies
Ever since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 widespread controversy has persisted 
over the question of whether or not western publics were misled. One common 
argument has been that the US and UK government lied with respect to the 
presence of WMD in Iraq. Debate about this in the United Kingdom has 
focused upon the Iraq Dossier, published by the UK government in September 
2002, which claimed that Iraqi WMD production was active and that weap-
ons could be launched within 45 minutes. A less common criticism has been 
that the UK government was deceptive regarding its desire for regime change 
and that officials misled with respect to their claimed commitment to the 
so-called ‘UN route’ through which Saddam could be disarmed peacefully via 
UN inspections and allowed to remain in power. Since then, multiple inquir-
ies (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee 2003; Intelligence 
and Security Committee 2003; Hutton Inquiry 2004; Butler Inquiry 2004 
and Chilcot Report 2016) have examined these questions whilst a number 
of academic studies (e.g. Aldrich 2005; Bluth 2004; Davis and Persbo 2004; 
Danner 2005; Doig et al. 2007; Humphreys 2005; Kettell 2008; Mearsheimer 
2011; McHugh 2013; Ralph 2011; Wither 2003–04) have, in a limited fashion, 
addressed the question of deception. We have reviewed these inquiries and 
studies previously (Herring and Robinson 2014a: 553–57 and 2014b: 215–17) 
and, in summary, none have adequately resolved the lying/deception issue. 
In two articles published in 2014 (Herring and Robinson 2014a and 
2014b), we argued that the evidence then available indicated that, with 
respect to WMD, the British government had engaged in a campaign of 
‘deceptive organized political persuasion’ whereby, through a process of 
omission and distortion, the UK government crafted the Iraq Dossier in a 
way that presented a deceptive view of Iraq’s assessed WMD capability. In 
particular, deliberate omissions and distortions enabled the British govern-
ment to create the impression of there being certainty over the presence 
of an active, and threatening WMD capability in Iraq. The second article 
(Herring and Robinson 2014b) evaluated a less well-known alleged decep-
tion concerning the role of the UN route and the issue of regime change. 
Ever since the invasion of Iraq, officials have maintained that they sought a 
peaceful solution to the WMD issue by attempting to use the UN to disarm 
Iraq, in which case Saddam’s regime would remain in power, and that they 
only resorted to force when this route was exhausted. That article, based 
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upon the limited documents then available, indicated that, rather than being 
a serious attempt at seeking a peaceful resolution to the ‘crisis’ with Iraq, the 
UN route was primarily aimed at both building support for war and gaining 
legal cover for UK military involvement. It was provisionally concluded that 
officials appeared to have engaged in distortions and omissions in a way that 
presented a deceptive impression of the UN route: people were encouraged 
to believe it was a real and genuine chance for peace, when in fact it was 
largely about getting the country to war. The hypotheses explored in these 
two papers are, in this article, assessed against the material now available in 
the 2016 Chilcot report.
Deception and propagandistic OPC
In order to evaluate the question of deceptive OPC, we employ a concep-
tual approach that distinguishes between non-deceptive and deceptive 
persuasion campaigns. ‘Organised political persuasion’ (OPP) (Herring 
and Robinson 2014a and 2014b), or ‘organised persuasive communica-
tion’ (OPC) (Robinson 2014), are terms developed to capture the essence 
of the array of euphemisms in circulation used to described persuasion 
and influence campaigns: these include terms such as propaganda, public 
relations (PR), strategic communication, political communication, public diplo-
macy, psychological operations (pys ops), perception management and informa-
tion management. The terms OPP and OPC were originally coined in order 
to avoid the euphemistic and value-laden nature of existing terms. Our 
conceptual approach draws upon the literatures on deception (e.g. Arendt 
1973; Bakir et al. 2017; Carson 2010; Cliffe et al 2000; Mearsheimer 2011) 
and on propaganda and persuasion (e.g. Corner 2007; Jowett and O’Donnell 
2012; Miller et al. 2017). It distinguishes between non-deceptive and decep-
tive persuasive communication through the use of the categories of deception 
through lying (‘making a statement one knows or suspects to be untrue in 
order to mislead’), deception through omission (‘withholding information to 
make the viewpoint being promoted more persuasive’) and deception through 
distortion (‘framing a statement in a deliberately misleading way to support 
the viewpoint being promoted’) (Herring and Robinson 2014a: 558–59). 
Alternatively, non-deceptive OPC refers to persuasion that is conducted 
honestly and without involving an effort to deceive, in particular by avoid-
ing, lies, distortion and omissions. This conceptual framework is subject to 
ongoing development and refinement but, for the purposes of this article, 
broadly the same conceptual framework is employed as was used in Herring 
and Robinson (2014a) and (2014b), albeit with one important modification: 
In this article deceptive OPP/OPC is referred to, at times, as a form of prop-
aganda. As such, we employ the widespread and common understanding 
of the term propaganda that defines it as a form of manipulative persua-
sion that violates rational or free will. Not all propaganda involves decep-
tion; other forms include communicative strategies involving incentivization 
and coercion (see Bakir et al. 2017 and Miller et al. 2017). However, for the 
purposes of this paper, it is important only to remember that deceptive OPC 
is understood as one form of propaganda. 
Research approach and methodology
The principle research approach involved applying the conceptual frame-
work to available evidence in order to identify the presence/absence of 
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deceptive OPC, defined through reference to the categories of lying, distortion 
and omission as set out above. The research proceeded by establishing 
whether official claims contained untruths or distortions or involved impor-
tant omissions, and then assessing whether they resulted from a deliberate 
intent to deceive about the essence of the situation. Of course, establish-
ing that government communications are misleading is an easier task than 
establishing intentionality, and due consideration was given to the possibility 
of self-deception and misperception on the part of those involved. Where 
uncertainty or lack of information prevented a clear assessment regard-
ing intentionality, this was duly noted. With respect to data sources, initial 
research (Herring and Robinson 2014a and 2014b) drew upon a review of 
statements and information from key actors that had been made available 
through the main inquiries, including the Select Committee Inquiries of 
2003, the Hutton Inquiry 2003, the Butler Inquiry 2004 and the 2016 Iraq 
Inquiry Report (referred to here as the Chilcot report). The key actors focused 
on initially were Tony Blair (UK Prime Minister), Alistair Campbell (Chief of 
Communications and Strategy), Sir David Omand (Security and Intelligence 
Co-ordinator), Sir John Scarlett (Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee 
[JIC]), Jack Straw (Foreign Secretary), Julian Miller (Head of assessment 
staff) and Jonathan Powell (Special Advisor to Blair). As part of a system-
atic check on the evidence, transcripts of their evidence were compiled and 
then searched for key references using a research assistant. A combination 
of testimonies, leaked contemporaneous documents and released contempo-
raneous documents were also analysed. This body of research (Herring and 
Robinson 2014a and 2014b) was evaluated against the relevant sections of 
the Chilcot report itself (Sections 3.1–4.3). In addition, primary accounts by 
ex-officials (e.g. Dr Brian Jones [Defence Intelligence Staff, DIS] and Paul 
Pillar [CIA and National Intelligence Council]) informed analysis as did 
information provided via the Iraq Inquiry Digest and further official docu-
ments (both leaked and obtained under the Freedom of Information Act).1 
Finally, the investigative journalism of Chris Ames (Iraq Inquiry Digest) and 
email discussions with Dr Brian Jones were drawn upon as were relevant 
secondary sources. All documentation and methodology details are available 
upon request.
We now turn to a review of arguments regarding deception over WMD 
and the UN route in light of the Chilcot report and its final conclusions. We 
address first the WMD issue and then the UN route deception. The final 
section addresses new evidence and issues (pertaining to the nature of the 
‘War on Terror’ and the role of propagandistic OPC) that were identified 
during the review and analysis of the Chilcot report.
seCTion Two: deCePTion over wmd And The ‘un rouTe’
The story of the September dossier on Iraqi WMD: Deception 
through omission and exaggeration
The Chilcot report confirms that the Iraq Dossier was the end prod-
uct of a lengthy process designed to ‘prepare’ public opinion for military 
action in Iraq. Following President Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ State of the Union 
Address on 30 January 2002, when he identified North Korea, Iran and Iraq 
as key threats due to their alleged sponsorship of terrorism and WMD, 
Blair commissioned a set of papers on WMD proliferation in February 
2002 (Chilcot 4.1: 166; 45).2 In March 2002, John Williams, a Foreign and 
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Common Wealth Office (FCO) communications official, described the 
strategy as follows:
The process of preparing media and public opinion for possible action 
on Iraq is underway … We should exploit this interest by feeding 
newspapers and broadcasters with information on WMD, diversion of 
imports for military use, and human rights abuse: all of it presented as 
evidence from the Government’s forthcoming dossier. By doing so, we 
can build momentum. 
(Chilcot 4.1: 342; 77)
Mirroring Williams, another FCO official noted that ‘[i]n the build up to any 
action, we would need an aggressive PR (public relations) campaign empha-
sizing … evidence of WMD reconstitution and other crimes (making maxi-
mum use of intelligence)’ (Chilcot 3.2: 101; 404).
Chilcot also confirms that there was, almost immediately, concern that 
the first dossier draft, which examined four countries of concern (Iraq, Iran, 
North Korea and Libya), failed to present a convincing case with regard 
to the WMD threat from Iraq. In particular, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw 
‘stated that the WMD paper had to show that Iraq posed an exceptional 
threat, and did not yet do so’ (Chilcot 4.1: 283; 63). In response, Sir John 
Scarlet, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence committee, suggested a strategy 
of deception through omission by suggesting that it be considered ‘whether 
the paper could achieve more impact if it “only covered Iraq”’: Scarlet 
stated ‘[t]his would have the benefit of obscuring the fact that in terms of 
WMD, Iraq is not that exceptional’ (Chilcot 4.1: 332; 76, emphasis added). 
Indeed, because of the weakness of the intelligence, Blair even considered 
finding alternative ways of justifying action against Iraq: ‘Mr Blair acknowl-
edged that “the immediate WMD problems don’t seem obviously worse 
than 3 years ago”’. Blair concluded: ‘So we have to re-order our story and 
message. Increasingly I think (these) should be about the nature of the 
regime’ (Chilcot 4.1; 355; 79). 
When, at this stage, it was decided to both focus the dossier on Iraq and 
postpone its publication, Straw was advised that the ‘evidence would not 
convince public opinion that there was an imminent threat from Iraq’ (Chilcot 
4.1; 386; 83). Memos dated 22 March expressed relief at the decision to post-
pone, the weakness of the intelligence case, and the need to ensure that any 
final dossier met ‘presentational needs’:
I am relieved that you decided to postpone publication of the unclas-
sified document … even the best survey of Iraq’s WMD programmes 
will not show much advance in recent years … we need to be convinc-
ing that: the threat is so serious/imminent that it is worth sending out 
troops to die for … We now have a bit more time to prepare the public 
dossier of material on Iraq. We need to use it to ensure that the material 
is accurate and meets the presentational needs of Ministers. 
(Chilcot 4.1: 392 & 395: 84–85)
As the United States moved closer to military action throughout the summer 
of 2002, concerns over the weakness of the WMD intelligence and the dossier 
persisted. For example, Mr Edward Chaplin, FCO Director for Middle East 
and North Africa, wrote that: 
4_JCIS_11.1&2_Robinson_47-73.indd   52 5/16/17   4:31 PM
Learning from the Chilcot report
www.intellectbooks.com  5352  International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies
‘(a)though the dossier includes some good material, it presents little 
new evidence of Iraq’s WMD to justify a move away from our policy of 
containment/deterrence’. Chaplin had also discussed the issue with SIS 
(Secret Intelligence Service/MI6) who took ‘the same view’. 
(Chilcot 4.2: 68; 126)
On August 20, one month prior to publication, Jack Straw informed US 
Secretary of State Colin Powell that ‘[t]he UK’s draft dossier on Iraq did not 
in his [Blair’s] view lead inexorably to the conclusion that military action was 
the only way to deal with Saddam Hussein. A better case for action could be 
made’ (Chilcot 4.2: 80; 127).
 As argued previously (Herring and Robinson 2014a: 565–68), and now 
corroborated by the Chilcot report, these pressures came to a head in the final 
weeks before the dossier was published. Following the decision by Blair at the 
start of September 2002 to publish the dossier within the next few weeks, offi-
cials were aware of the urgent need to strengthen it. Straw’s Special Adviser Dr 
Michael Williams noted that it was ‘certainly not a killer dossier’ and that ‘[we]
need, I believe, to regard the publication of the strongest material as a politi-
cal imperative’ (Chilcot, 4.2: 168; 144–55). With SIS (MI6) tasked with search-
ing though intelligence that might be used in the dossier (Chilcot 4.2: 195–200; 
149–50), Alastair Campbell (Chief of Communications and Strategy), noted 
that the dossier ‘had to be revelatory and we need to show that it was new and 
informative and part of a bigger case’ (Chilcot 4.2: 209; 151). At the JIC meeting 
of September 11, it was minuted that the dossier needed to have dramatic impact: 
the part of the draft that looked at what was known or assessed from 
intelligence was at the heart of the dossier with the potential to have a 
significant impact. It needed to be as factual as possible, and to convey 
accurately but dramatically the rising concern about Iraq’s weapons 
programmes. 
(Chilcot, 4.2: 335; 177, emphasis added)
The need to strengthen the dossier was also noted in a memo from No. 10:
But No. 10 through the Chairman want the document to be as strong as 
possible within the bounds of available [sic] intelligence. This is there-
fore a last (!) call for any items of intelligence that agencies think can 
and should be included. 
(Chilcot Report, 4.2: 365; 183)
It was in this context of pressure and urgency that the most significant exam-
ple of deception through distortion occurred. On September 11 a piece of late 
breaking intelligence was issued, just thirteen days before publication of the 
dossier, claiming that there was active chemical agent production in Iraq. We 
refer to this as Report X, following Dr Brian Jones’ (Defence Intelligence Staff 
[DIS]) account of these events (Jones 2010). The Chilcot report and the Butler 
Inquiry referred to this variously as the ‘September 11 Report’, the ‘SIS Report’ 
and the ‘compartmented intelligence’: for clarity we refer to it as Report X. As 
set out in ‘Report X Marks the Spot’ (Herring and Robinson 2014a: 569–71), 
this piece of intelligence was from a ‘source on trial’ and speculative in that it 
only promised substantial evidence at a future date. Moreover the intelligence 
was ‘sub-sourced’: that is to say the source was claiming to be in contact with 
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another source who was making the claims. Ultimately, despite the flimsy 
and speculative nature of this intelligence, and the fact that it had not been 
assessed by the relevant intelligence experts (DIS), it was used to strengthen 
the leading claim of the dossier that there was active chemical and biological 
agent production in Iraq (Herring and Robinson 2014a: 571–74). It was also 
used to underpin the claim that WMD could be launched within 45 mintes 
(Herring and Robinson 2014a: 574–576). Chilcot confirms that it was the use 
of Report X that led to the dossier reaching beyond the bounds of the avail-
able intelligence (4.2: 653–57; 239): Chilcot states 
the Inquiry shares the view of the Butler Review that the dossier 
contained a stronger assessment in relation to Iraqi chemical weap-
ons production than was justified by the intelligence. The SIS report of 
11 September was a factor in that.
Who was responsible for using Report X?
Despite confirming the distorting/exaggerating impact Report X had on the 
dossier, Chilcot regrettably fails to clarify who was responsible for decid-
ing to use it and, critically, the extent to which Blair himself was involved. 
Consistent with the analysis provided in ‘Report X Marks the Spot’, Chilcot 
does note the contrasting statements from Sir Richard Dearlove (Head of 
SIS/MI6), who insists he did not allow Report X to be used in the dossier, and 
both Campbell’s claim that he (Dearlove) had authorized its use ‘through 
assertion’, and Scarlett’s confirmation that the report was used to underpin 
the claims that WMD production was judged to be active (Chilcot 4.2: 403–43; 
190–96). Chilcot also confirms the precise chronology of events surrounding 
the use of Report X: It was issued on September 11 when Dearlove briefed 
Scarlett about it but agreed it should not be incorporated into the dossier; 
‘Sir Richard believed that it would be too risky to include the material from 
the new source [in the dossier] … Mr Scarlett agreed that the report would 
not be fed into ‘today’s discussion of [the draft dossier]’ (Chilcot 4.2: 408; 
190–91). Then, on 12 September, Blair was briefed about Report X and, with 
respect to this meeting, Chilcot repeats the Butler Inquiry statement that:
Nevertheless, it may be that, in the context of the intense interest at that 
moment in the status of Iraq’s prohibited weapons programmes, and 
in particular continuing work on the dossier, the concurrence of events 
caused more weight to be given to this unvalidated new source than 
would normally have been the case. 
(Butler Report cited in Chilcot 4.2: 436; 195)
Present at this meeting were Blair’s special advisors Sir David Manning and 
Jonathan Powell, Alastair Campbell, Dearlove and one other individual from 
SIS(MI6). As already noted above, Campbell claims that the new intelligence 
(Report X) was offered by Dearlove to be used ‘through assertion’. The following 
day, Chilcot indicates that Campbell then communicated current thinking on the 
dossier, which would presumably include any decisions made at the 12 September 
meeting, to Julian Miller (Scarlett’s second in command re the dossier):
381. When Mr Miller asked to talk to someone in No. 10 about the latest 
thinking on the dossier, ‘without getting into circulating copies just so 
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as they are on the right track’, Mr Smith suggested he should speak to 
Mr Campbell or Mr Tom Kelly on 13 September.
382. On 13 September, Mr Campbell wrote: ‘Meeting with Julian Miller 
… to go through the new structure’. 
(Chilcot Report: 4.2: 381–382; 186)
What can we, then, conclude about responsibility for the decision to use Report 
X? Overall, the chronology of events, and the decision by Chilcot to reiterate 
the statement from the Butler Report that circumstances ‘caused more weight 
to be given to’ Report X ‘than would normally have been the case’, strongly 
suggest that the key decision was taken by officials at the 12 September brief-
ing. So far as we are aware, neither Scarlett nor Miller, who were in charge of 
the dossier and the intelligence judgements, were present at the 12 September 
briefing. The following day, Miller spoke with Campbell when he was briefed 
as to the ‘latest thinking on the dossier’ and it seems likely that decisions 
made during the 12 September briefing were passed on to those in charge of 
the dossier, communicating, in Campbell’s words, Dearlove’s permission to 
use Report X ‘through assertion’. Chilcot, however, does not clarify who ulti-
mately made the decision to use Report X in the dossier. This continues to be 
of major concern because, as explained in ‘Report X Marks the Spot’, if Blair or 
his advisors played any role in the decision, then the dossier would no longer 
be purely the work the intelligence services (as has always and rigorously 
been maintained by the government) and there would have been clear and 
demonstrable political contamination of the intelligence assessment process.
Failing to consider the honesty and probity of officials
This shortcoming is indicative of a broader failure of Chilcot to pass judge-
ment on the individuals involved. Overall there is now a convergence 
of evidence (Chilcot Report 2016; Herring and Robinson 2014a; Butler 
Inquiry 2004) demonstrating that the dossier evolved over many months 
and involved deception through exaggerations/distortions and omissions. 
Discussed here, the decisions to omit other more threatening countries 
from the dossier (Scarlett’s ‘obscure’ advice, see above) and, most signifi-
cantly, the decision to use a flimsy piece of intelligence from a source on 
trial that led to clear distortion of claims regarding the certainty of intelli-
gence regarding active WMD production (the leading claim in the dossier), 
are only the most prominent examples of decisions that led to the creation 
of a deceptive dossier. In a recent commons hearing, Chilcot supports the 
analysis that the overall problem (including presumably both the dossier 
and Blair’s related statements re WMD and Iraq), was one of exaggeration 
(i.e. distortion): ‘It was exaggeration, placing more weight on the intelli-
gence than it could possibly bear is a conclusion we reached’ (House of 
Commons 2016). Chilcot also stated that Blair used ‘all the powers of advo-
cacy’ and in doing so went ‘beyond the facts of the case and the basic anal-
ysis of that can support’ (House of Commons 2016). All of this occurred 
in the context of it being widely understood that the intelligence base was 
weak and immense pressure to generate a more credible basis for action 
against Iraq. In other words, there was little evidence of self deception or 
misperception about the Iraqi threat and the strength of the intelligence 
(Herring and Robinson 2014a). Moreover, Chilcot believes that these kinds 
of exaggerations and omissions were intentional. He describes the focus on 
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WMD as a ‘tactic’ by Blair ‘to emphasize the threat which Iraq might pose, 
rather than a more balanced consideration of both Iraq’s capabilities and 
intent’ (Chilcot 3.1: 4; 312). Recently, Chilcot stated:
I absolve him of a personal and demonstrable decision to deceive 
Parliament or the public … to say falsehoods knowing them to be false 
… However, he also exercised his very considerable powers of advocacy 
and persuasion rather than laying the real issues fairly and squarely. 
(House of Commons 2016)
In other words, deception through exaggeration rather than deception 
through lying. And yet despite all of the evidence regarding exaggeration, 
omission and intentionality, Chilcot avoids either reaching the logical conclu-
sion, or properly evaluating its likelihood, that officials (including but not 
restricted to Blair) bear responsibility for having misled and deceived with 
respect to their claims regarding intelligence and Iraqi WMD. As we shall see 
next, when discussing the UN route/regime change deception, a similar reluc-
tance to address the probity of officials is apparent.
The UN route: Obfuscating the regime change objective
The second hypothesized deception concerned the issue of regime change 
and the ‘UN route’. Throughout the build-up to the war it had been main-
tained by officials that the British government genuinely sought a peaceful 
resolution to the situation with Iraq by disarming it via UN weapons inspec-
tions (see Blair 2010: 50–51 and Greenstock 2009: 9), an outcome that would 
leave Saddam in power. The problem with this public line is that it is diffi-
cult, arguably impossible, to square with the knowledge that the US govern-
ment had been committed to regime change in Iraq ever since the passing of 
the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998. According to many commentators (e.g. Battle 
2010; Prados and Ames 2010), 9/11 presented officials with the opportunity 
to realize this objective. Of course, if the United States was committed to 
regime change, and provided the British government was aware that this was 
the case, suggestion that there was possibility of a peaceful solution via Iraqi 
compliance would have been a deception.
So, what do we now know about the matter of regime change and the 
UN route? First, the Chilcot report supports the thesis that a policy of regime 
change came first, and that only after this did the UN route then emerge as 
a way of building a coalition in support of attacking Iraq and ensuring British 
involvement was legally defendable. It was not, according to the bulk of the 
evidence provided by the Chilcot report, a sincere effort to peacefully resolve 
the crisis through disarmament. According to Chilcot, UK policy coalesced 
around regime change in early 2002, following Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ State of 
the Union address in January. In February 2002 a meeting was held to which 
Alastair Campbell referred to as a ‘Phase 2 War meeting’. Although there was 
no official record of this meeting, the Chilcot report uses a Guardian newspa-
per article to relay its contents:
A ‘senior No. 10 official’ was reported to have said that the meeting 
between Mr Blair and Bush in April would ‘finalise Phase 2 of the war 
against terrorism’. As with Usama Bin Laden and the war in Afghanistan, 
it would be necessary to maintain public and international support for 
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military action against Saddam Hussein. That was a ‘public persuasion’ 
issue which would be tackled ‘in the same way’ as the unprecedented 
‘indictment’ against Usama Bin Laden published in October 2001. 
(Chilcot 3.2: 67; 398)
In March 2002, the leaked ‘Iraq: Options Paper’ stated that UK policy was to 
‘re-integrate a law-abiding Iraq which does not possess WMD or threaten its 
neighbours’ but that this ‘implicitly […] cannot occur with Saddam Hussein 
in power’ (UK Defence and Overseas Secretariat [DOS] 2002: 1). It concluded 
that ‘the use of overriding force in a ground campaign is the only option that 
we can be confident to remove Saddam’. Sent only to some members of Blair’s 
Cabinet, the Options Paper indicated the emergence of a regime change policy 
as the only way to deal with Iraq. Because of the way in which some members 
of the Cabinet, and indeed the public, were kept in the dark about its existence, 
it can be understood as an instance of deception through omission (Herring and 
Robinson 2014b: 221). Further important evidence that regime change, and not 
disarmament, was the British goal comes in the form of a memo sent by Blair 
to his advisor Jonathan Powell in March 2002. In this memo, referred to earlier, 
Blair acknowledges that the ‘immediate WMD problems don’t seem obviously 
worse than 3 years ago’ before discussing other justifications for action:
So we have to re-order our story and message. Increasingly, I think it 
should be about the nature of the regime. We do intervene-as per the 
Chicago speech. We have no inhibitions-where we reasonably can-
about nation-building i.e. we must come to our conclusion on Saddam 
from our own position. 
(Chilcot 4.1: 351–355; 79)
Although Blair has subsequently claimed that the memo was about disarming 
Iraq through either peaceful means or military action, his suggestion of justi-
fying war as a humanitarian intervention involving nation building strongly 
indicates that the objective was to topple Saddam, one way or another, rather 
than to seek disarmament through peaceful means if possible. Indeed, there is 
nothing in the wording of the memo that suggests the objective was anything 
other than regime change.
With a policy of regime change established, the lead up to the Blair-Bush 
Crawford meeting in April 2002 reveals frequent discussions over using the 
‘UN route’ as a way of getting to war. FCO advice for Blair’s 11 March meet-
ing with the US Vice President Dick Cheney stated that:
Military action requires key allies, particularly in the region, to be 
onboard. That is why we see continuing with the UN route- i.e. ratchet-
ing up pressure on Iraq to comply with UN resolutions and allow weap-
ons inspectors back in as a necessary precursor. We doubt Saddam will 
co-operate but we must be seen to have tried. 
(Chilcot 3.2: 352; 449)
In the context of discussing UK support for regime change in Iraq, Sir David 
Manning pointed out the importance of taking:
… time and trouble over the UN observers. Demonstrating to inter-
national opinion that Saddam was in breach of the UNSCRs … was 
4_JCIS_11.1&2_Robinson_47-73.indd   57 5/16/17   4:31 PM
Piers Robinson
www.intellectbooks.com  5958  International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies
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a crucial part of coalition building … It should not be impossible to 
persuade moderate public opinion that it was Saddam who was at fault 
if he flouted the conditions and blocked the inspectors. 
(Chilcot 3.2: 380; 453)
Chilcot confirms that Blair then offered support to US Vice President Cheney 
for regime change so long as there was a ‘clever strategy’ which involved 
building a case via UN Security Council resolutions. Chilcot quotes Blair:
… it was highly desirable to get rid of Saddam … the UK would help … 
as long as there was a clever strategy … It was important to take enough 
time to put Saddam in the wrong place over inspections and compliance 
with UNSCRs. This would play an important part in convincing interna-
tional opinion to rally to the idea of regime change. 
(Chilcot 32: 358; 450)
Finally, as we have previously argued (Herring and Robinson 2014b), Jack 
Straw spelled out how it was essential for the United Kingdom to follow the 
‘UN route’, emphasizing its necessity for ensuring that any military action was 
legal and for shoring up political support. He describes the importance of the 
re-admission of weapons inspectors with respect to both ‘public explanation’ 
and ‘in terms of legal sanction for any subsequent military action’. Referring 
to legal ‘elephant traps’, he states that ‘regime change per se (original empha-
sis) is no justification for military action’. He elaborates thus: ‘Of course, we 
may want credibly to assert that regime change is an essential part of the 
strategy by which to achieve our ends-that of the elimination of Iraq’s WMD 
capacity: but the latter has to be the goal’ (Herring and Robinson 2014b: 224).
Following Crawford, the Chilcot report continues to paint a picture of 
regime change being pursued whilst misleadingly presenting UK strategy 
as based on the objective of disarmament and maintaining that there was 
a realistic possibility of a peaceful outcome via Iraqi compliance.3 Through 
June, July and August of 2002 pressures on officials increased: As it became 
obvious the United States were moving swiftly towards war, there was still 
no obvious legal cover for British involvement and there was the clear risk 
that the UN might be completely sidelined in favour of unilateral US action 
(thereby damaging Blair’s political conditions needed for a successful regime 
change). In late July, Powell’s advice to Blair was clear and is worth reprint-
ing at length:
I think we need a road map to getting rid of Saddam, drawing parallels 
as far as possible with his [President Bush’s] success in Afghanistan, 
including the following elements: 
We will be there when the US takes the decision to act, but … 
We need to set an ultimatum as we did to the Taliban in Afghanistan.
At a certain point we need to make it clear that unless Saddam agrees 
to inspectors on our terms – anyone, any time, anywhere – by a certain 
date we will act. 
We need to establish a legal basis. More difficult for us than for them. 
It needs to be based on WMD rather than terrorism or regime change. 
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We need at least neutrality in the region before we can act … If we 
want to base our troops in the region this will mean a real effort on the 
MEPP … 
We need to make the case. We need a plan and a timetable for releasing 
the papers we have prepared on human rights abuses, WMD etc. We 
need to have the sort of Rolls Royce information campaign we had at 
the end of Afghanistan before we start in Iraq. 
We need a convincing military plan. What we know about so far is not 
convincing … 
And we need a plan for the day after … We need to be working on this 
now. 
(Chilcot 3.3: 287; 50)
Following this, Blair communicated his support directly to Bush. On 28 July 
2002, he sent a note that started ‘I will be with you, whatever’ (Blair 2002). 
The note then discussed that getting rid of Saddam was the ‘right thing to 
do’ but that political support was weak. Blair then set out the advantages of 
developing the UN route and the way in which this could create a casus belli. 
In a section of the note headed ‘UN’, Blair (2002) writes:
But we need, as with Afghanistan and the ultimatum to the Taleban, 
to encapsulate our casus belli in some defining way. This (the UN) is 
certainly the simplest. We could, in October as the build up starts, state 
that he must let the inspectors back in unconditionally and do so now, 
i.e. set a 7-day deadline. It might be backed by a UNSCR or not …
I know there will be reluctance to this. But it would neutralize opposi-
tion around the UN issue. If he did say yes, we continue the build-up 
and we send teams over and the moment he obstructs, we say: he’s 
back to his games. That’s it. In any event, he probably would screw it up 
and not meet the deadline, and if he came forward after the deadline, 
we would just refuse to deal.
Having advocated the use of the UN as a way of creating a casus belli, with 
no indication that there was any hope or expectation that this might lead 
to a peaceful resolution through Iraqi compliance, Blair finished by stating, 
‘We would support in any way we can … On timing, we could start building 
up after the break. A strike date could be Jan/Feb next year. But the crucial 
issue is not when, but how’ (Blair 2002). In a meeting between Manning and 
Armitage, dated 31 July 2002, the ‘importance of the UN route with an ultima-
tum for political and “optical” reasons’ (Chilcot 3.3: 462; 80, emphasis added) 
was emphasized by Manning.
Resolving Claims and Counter Claims
However, despite the clear contemporaneous documentary evidence indicat-
ing that the UN route was primarily a means to achieving regime change, 
Blair and some other officials still maintain that it was a genuine attempt at 
a peaceful resolution. For example, Blair stated that the goal of getting the 
United States to go through the UN was ‘primarily to build a broad coali-
tion against Saddam and to show we were prepared to disarm him peacefully’ 
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(Chilcot 3.3: 450; 78). Also, the Chilcot report makes very clear that, at the 
time, ‘In his public statements, Mr Blair clearly presented the strategy as 
providing a final opportunity for Saddam to disarm peacefully’ (Chilcot 3.4: 
588; 194). Some other officials, especially Greenstock and Straw, maintain 
that the UN route was a genuine attempt at peaceful disarmament and that 
they had been assured of this. 
How can we resolve the apparent contradiction between evidence that 
the goal was regime change and claims that peaceful disarmament was being 
allowed for? In fact, an examination of a key period in August/September 
2002, when the Bush administration finally agreed to sign up to the UN 
route, is instructive here. Here the Chilcot report offers only ambiguous and 
limited evidence that some officials did believe that there was a possibility 
for a peaceful resolution. For example, evidence from Jack Straw cited in the 
Inquiry Report indicates that he believed that ‘it would be harder to make the 
case for military action if he (Saddam Hussein) had been disarmed’ (Chilcot 
3.4: 108; 113, emphasis added). Based upon his interpretation of Bush’s state-
ment in a meeting that ‘the objective of regime change was getting rid of 
WMD’, Colin Powell stated that the ‘logic of the President’s position meant 
that, if WMD were dealt with, regime change would no longer be required’. 
Powell also noted that he felt that others in the meeting did not appreciate 
this (Chilcot 3.4: 115; 114). However, Chilcot also notes that Powell summed 
up his discussion with Straw stating that ‘A key question then was whether 
we could live with a Saddam who had fulfilled the UN mandate’ (Chilcot 
3.4: 118; 114). Chilcot notes that Bush, in his memoirs claimed the UN route 
was a genuine attempt at a peaceful resolution (Chilcot 3.4: 376; 159). Other 
officials, as noted above, claim to have been assured that the UN route was 
a genuine attempt at a peaceful resolution. In constrast, however, US Vice 
President Cheney makes clear that leaving the regime in place, even if there 
had been disarmament, was never accepted: He states that, during the 7 
September meeting with Blair and other British officials, no one argued ‘that 
leaving Saddam in power, with all the risks and costs associated with that 
course, was a viable option’ (Chilcot 3.4: 384; 160). 
In fact, what appears to have happened during the critical period in late 
August/September 2002, when the United States agreed to go down the 
UN route (as opposed to taking immediate unilateral military action against 
Iraq), is that the UN route was argued for, at least in part, as a mechanism 
for facilitating the internal collapse of Saddam’s regime. From this perspec-
tive, it seems that a ‘peaceful outcome’ actually meant avoiding military action 
by forcing the collapse of the regime, rather than successful disarmament via 
the UN route and allowing Saddam to remain in power. For example, at the 
end of August/beginning of September, conversations between Manning and 
Condoleeza Rice discussed an intrusive resolution aimed at ‘forcing Iraq to be 
run in a completely different way’ and involved US forces being stationed both 
in and around Iraq (Chilcot 3.4: 169; 124/230; 134). Blair also presents the UN 
route, during internal discussions, as a way of avoiding war by collapsing the 
regime. On 6 September he stated that the immediate issue was ‘how to maxi-
mize the chance of resolving the Saddam dilemma quickly and cleanly’. It was 
possible that sustained pressure would lead to his quick collapse’ (Chilcot 3.4: 
407; 163). Blair goes on to state that ‘[t]he trick would be to make a resolu-
tion acceptable to [UN] Security Council members but sufficiently stringent to 
bring about profound change in Iraq were Saddam to implement it’ (Chilcot 
3.4: 413; 164). Indeed, the idea of Saddam’s regime collapsing as a result of 
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tough inspections occurs regularly during the months running up to the inva-
sion: For example, on 3 November 2002 Rice and Manning discussed the 
possibility of securing regime change without military action, noting that ‘a 
very tough UN resolution accompanied by threatening military preparations, 
in the hope that Saddam’s system would implode under the strain’, was the 
best hope of achieving that (Chilcot 3.5: 751; 330); Again, in mid-November, 
Blair discussed ways of splitting Saddam from his regime and notes that ‘we 
should be working assiduously on trying to weaken his regime from within’ 
(Chilcot 3.6: 48; 14).4
At the same time, officials also indicate that they had little belief that 
Saddam would ever comply with a new UN resolution and intrusive inspec-
tions. For Blair, again, the strategy was discussed in terms of it providing a 
casus belli:
Mr Blair said that it was ‘unlikely’ that Saddam would comply with the 
new resolution; even if he let inspectors back in he would probably 
prevent them from doing their job. He added: ‘we should then be in a 
very powerful position in demanding action in response to his obstruc-
tion and prevarication’. 
(Chilcot Report 3.4: 411; 164)
Indeed, in private around 5/6 September, Washington Ambassador 
Christopher Meyer, discussing US ideas for an ‘Inspection Implementation 
Force’ and other intrusive policies, and the lack of chance that Iraq might 
accept them, said that one official had said ‘but that was the whole point’ 
(Chilcot 3.4; 330; 152). In this respect, one purpose of the UN route strategy, 
according to Blair, was about shifting responsibility to Saddam whilst making 
it appear that the United States and United Kingdom were using force only as 
a last resort: Chilcot cites David Manning’s relaying of Blair’s analysis:
[Blair] … emphasized the need to play Iraq cleverly. We must look 
reluctant to use force … You [Mr Blair] were increasingly convinced 
that, in the end, people would come round to accepting the need to 
deal with Saddam, if we had made full and willing use of the UN route. 
You were confident that we could get the Security Council behind us 
once we had demonstrated clearly that Saddam remained in violation. 
But if we appeared to be riding roughshod over the UN … opinion 
would be very difficult to shift … Once we had a new resolution…. We 
would be putting the onus on Saddam as Bush wanted. 
(Chilcot 3.4: 496; 177)
Other evidence from Chilcot indicates that officials were engaging in 
deception through distortion by emphasizing the need to push the public 
line that peace was desired and that regime change might just be an 
accidental consequence of disarmament: in a communication between Sir 
David Manning and Condoleeza Rice, Manning states that they must make 
their case ‘with conviction and make it absolutely clear that we wanted it to 
succeed. We should be emphasizing at every turn that war was the last resort’ 
(Chilcot 3.4: 499–500; 178); Straw communicated to Colin Powell the British 
line that ‘Blair’s whole focus was on inspectors: regime change might be an 
incidental consequence of our policy but it was not the aim’ (Chilcot 3.4: 515; 
180, emphasis added). 
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Drawing conclusions regarding the UN route deception
In our earlier article (Herring and Robinson 2014b) we provisionally concluded, 
based on evidence available prior to the Chilcot report, that there appeared 
to have been deception through omission and distortion regarding the UN 
route. Is it now possible to make a final determination? Ultimately, Blair’s 
public presentation of the UN route as a last chance to disarm disguises the 
fact that internal deliberations show that it was a strategy thought of primar-
ily as a way of gaining legal cover for the United Kingdom to join military 
action against Iraq and build international support for military action by creat-
ing a clear violation on the part of Saddam that would then be used to justify 
action. Moreover, the substance of some of the ultimatum discussions in 
September 2002, when the United States finally agreed to go the UN route 
rather than unilaterally attack Iraq, suggested that one intention was that, if 
Iraq complied, it would lead to a situation where the regime would collapse. 
Accordingly, there is little evidence to suggest that the goal of regime change 
ever changed. The likely deception here, then, is that the public communi-
cations of Blair (and other officials) presented the United States and United 
Kingdom as offering a fair and genuine approach to disarming Iraq peace-
fully, which allowed Saddam the opportunity to comply with UN resolutions 
and then remain in power, when, in fact, their true intentions were always to 
remove Saddam from power. This would have been an important deception 
because it would have had the effect of undercutting opposition to war by 
misleading some people into believing there was a real possibility of peace-
ful accommodation. Not only would this deception have been important 
regarding levels of public support, it would also have played into UN Security 
Council negotiations over Resolution 1441 during which key members such as 
Russia and France were reassured that the United States and United Kingdom 
were seriously committed to a peaceful resolution whereby the regime would 
be allowed to remain in power if it complied with UN resolutions. Without 
such reassurance, it is unlikely they would have agreed to Resolution 1441. In 
terms of the conceptual framework, at the very least this would appear to be 
a case of deception through omission and distortion: omission of the main inten-
tions behind the UN route and exaggeration of the possibility of a peaceful 
outcome. If it was the case that Blair and Bush never had any intention of 
allowing the regime to stay in place, as Cheney indicated, then the deception 
here is closer to one involving a lie, whereby officials claimed that they would 
allow Saddam to remain in power if he disarmed when, in fact, they never 
had any intention of allowing for this possibility. 
Importantly, there was little evidence from the Chilcot report of self-
deception, whereby officials actually believed that the UN route being devised 
held out a real possibility for a peaceful resolution: indeed, the deliberations 
repeatedly show that key officials did not believe it would work. Moreover, 
the language used in some documents indicates that officials were actively 
and consciously (i.e. intentionally) engaged in misrepresenting the truth of 
what was going on: ‘We must look reluctant to use force’ (Chilcot 3.4: 496; 
177, emphasis added), use the UN route for ‘optical’ reasons (Chilcot 3.3: 462; 
80, emphasis added), ‘we must be emphasizing at every turn that war was the 
last resort’ (Chilcot 3.4: 500; 178; emphasis added), and that regime change 
could be an ‘incidental consequence of policy’ (Chilcot 3.4: 515; 180, emphasis 
added), are all examples of officials stressing the need to obscure the reality of 
what was going on. 
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Finally, to believe that, by the summer/autumn of 2002, either the United 
States or British governments had actually elected to allow Saddam the chance 
to remain in power would require believing that the United States had, effec-
tively, abandoned its long-standing policy of regime change and that Blair 
had also shifted his position of intending to remove Saddam. Moreover, when 
Saddam actually admitted inspectors and offered close to full cooperation 
(December through March 2003), this was still not enough for the United 
States and United Kingdom who, ultimately, invaded Iraq before the UN 
route had been exhausted: as Chilcot concluded, the war was not one of last 
resort and the UN route was never exhausted (Chilcot Executive Summary: 
20; 6). All of this is powerful evidence that at least some UK officials, includ-
ing Blair, were engaged in intentional deception at least through exaggera-
tion and omission. It is not possible to determine, based upon the evidence 
examined to date, that Bush and Blair did not hold some belief in the possibil-
ity, however remote, that a peaceful outcome might have occurred. Hence it 
cannot be concluded that deception through lying occurred. However, we can 
now say with confidence that officials were involved in actively promoting a 
public rationale that appeared to provide an opportunity for peaceful disar-
mament, whilst all the while working as hard as possible to achieve regime 
change and in full knowledge that to achieve this military force would most 
likely be necessary.
Chilcot again fails to consider the honesty and probity of officials
As with the WMD issue, despite all of the evidence that officials were less 
than forthcoming regarding the main purpose of the UN route, Chilcot does 
not engage with the question of possible deception. Interestingly, in fact, 
Chilcot does acknowledge that some officials saw the UN route mainly in 
terms of securing legal cover for war rather than achieving peaceful disarma-
ment (Chilcot 3.5: 887–89; 358); he also concludes that ‘a new UN resolu-
tion was a key element of Mr Blair’s ‘clever strategy’ to obtain US and UK 
objectives (Chilcot 3.5: 1081; 386). Of course, this ‘clever strategy’ had origi-
nally been articulated in the context of assuring UK support for the US objec-
tive of regime change (see Blair’s assurance to Cheney in March 2002 [Chilcot: 
3.2: 353; 449]). However, Chilcot does not resolve the contradiction that is 
obviously implied here regarding the real purpose of the UN route and, as 
with the WMD issue, avoids questioning the honesty and good intentions 
of those involved. Perhaps part of the problem here is that, as recently indi-
cated in the recent Commons committee hearing, Chilcot appears to under-
stand deception only in terms of outright lying: As noted earlier regarding 
the WMD claims, Chilcot absolved Blair ‘of a personal and demonstrable 
decision to deceive Parliament or the public … to say falsehoods knowing 
them to be false’; but he does state that Blair was not reasonable or fair in his 
‘advocacy and persuasion’ and that ‘it was exaggeration’ that Blair was guilty 
of. Of course, and as set out in our conceptual framework, deception can occur 
through exaggeration and omission: and this is precisely what appears to have 
also happened in relation to the UN route/regime change public line. In short, 
the evidence is not there that lying occurred, but there is ample evidence to 
support the thesis of deception through exaggeration and omission. Chilcot, 
however, is clearly reluctant to tackle this issue and this must be considered a 
shortcoming of the report.
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seCTion Three: frAgmenTs of A bigger PiCTure; whAT 
seCTion 3.1 of The ChiLCoT rePorT TeLLs us AbouT 9/11 And 
The ‘wAr on Terror’
Beyond WMD and the UN route, the most revealing information to emerge 
from the Chilcot report, contained in section 3.1, pertains to the formative 
stages of the ‘War on Terror’ during the immediate aftermath of 9/11. In 
fact, examination of this phase also helps to shed further light on the WMD 
and UN route deceptions which occurred during the run up to the inva-
sion of Iraq. Section 3.1 provides important indications of both the breadth 
and depth of the ‘War on Terror’, and the way in which it appears to have 
formed part of a broader strategy aimed at pursuing geo-strategic objectives 
both in the Middle East and more widely, often only tangentially connected 
with tackling Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. It is to a consideration of this 
suggestive information, and how it opens up new areas for inquiry, that we 
now turn.
Further Support for the WMD and UN route deceptions
First and foremost, Section 3.1 confirms that the plans for invading Iraq were 
under way, on both sides of the Atlantic, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. 
In fact, the Chilcot report cites a British embassy report from prior to 9/11 
which noted ‘the growing pressure to change course from containment to 
military action to oust Saddam Hussein’ (Chilcot 3.1: 30; 318). Hence the 
firming-up of Iraq policy was occurring before 9/11 and reflected the reality of 
the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (which had made the removal of Saddam offi-
cial US policy) and the emerging constellation of interests based around the 
neo-conservative movement. Following 9/11 the removal of Saddam Hussein 
became top priority. The Chilcot report cites Alastair Campbell’s diaries with 
respect to a 20 September 2001 meeting between Bush and Blair in which the 
focus on Afghanistan was emphasized, but in which Bush ‘also talked about 
how they could go after Saddam’s oilfields’ (Chilcot 3.1: 89; 328). By mid 
November 2001, Jonathan Powell was advising Blair that ‘only the removal 
of Saddam Hussein and a new regime would deal with the risks from Iraq’ 
(Chilcot 3.1: 183; 345). In late November, a memo titled ‘Iraq: Change of Heart 
or Change of Regime’ specified UK objectives as ‘the removal of Saddam and 
replacement by a new, more moderate regime’. This could be achieved by the 
‘US, UK and others’ setting ‘up a UN ‘demand for the return of inspectors’ 
followed by:
a military plan, and if Saddam failed to meet the demands, there would 
be grounds to go ahead with the military plan … [reference to a possible 
coup]. Supported by air power and a small number of Special Forces 
in support roles. Need to be clear with everyone that this time we are 
going all the way …’. 
(Chilcot 3.1: 265; 357)
In a possible example of deception through omission, Powell advised that 
officials should not publicly acknowledge that regime change was the goal: 
‘regime change would be desirable, but not our formal objective for the 
moment’. He also stated that if ‘Saddam did allow the inspectors in, there 
would be a “need to find a new demand to justify military action”’ (Chilcot 
3.1: 265; 357). 
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By December it appears that Powell’s advice had been adopted by Blair. 
In a telephone conversation between Bush and Blair on 3 December 2001, 
Blair stated ‘it would be excellent to get rid of Saddam. But there needed 
to be a clever strategy for doing this’. Chilcot notes that Blair repeated this 
again during the telephone call: ‘… not opposed to action against Saddam. 
But an extremely clever plan would be required’ (Chilcot 3.1: 330; 367–368). 
The elements of this clever plan were detailed in a memo to Bush dated 
4 December 2001: Blair wrote of a ‘strategy for regime change that builds 
overtime’ involving ‘softening up first’ via demanding the return of weapons 
inspectors and implying that military action would follow if Saddam failed 
to comply as well as engaging in a raft of strategies aimed at weakening the 
regime (Blair 2001a). These included enforcing the existing no-fly zones on ‘a 
more intensive basis’, supporting opposition groups, mounting ‘covert opera-
tions with people and groups with the ability to topple Saddam’ and backing 
any emerging rebellions. Blair’s advice to Bush, involving a covert, subtle and 
apparently deceptive approach to removing Saddam, is spelled out clearly in 
the concluding paragraph:
So: my strategy is to build this over time until we get to the point where 
military action could be taken if necessary: but meanwhile bring people 
toward us, undermine Saddam, without so alarming people about the 
immediacy of action that we frighten the horses, lose Russia and/or 
half the EU and nervous Arab states and find ourselves facing a choice 
between massive intervention or nothing.
Ultimately, of course, and as detailed in the preceding section on the UN 
route, it was broadly this plan, this ‘clever strategy’, that came to be executed. 
Overall, Section 3.1 and its insights regarding the genesis of the Iraq 
regime change strategy, although covering a period well in advance of the 
run-up to war, does inevitably add further weight to the arguments devel-
oped in the previous sections of this article that claims made during the run 
up to war regarding pressing WMD threats and UN-based peaceful disar-
mament were largely propaganda strategies designed to help realize regime 
change.
Evidence of a much wider deception regarding the ‘war on terror’ 
and regime change wars 
But there is also further information in Section 3.1 that is indicative of the 
emergence of a much wider geo-strategic policy involving a belligerent 
strategy aimed at coercing ‘enemy’ states including those uninvolved with 
Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. First, and remarkably, Section 3.1 reports a 
British embassy cable that indicates that some in the US administration were 
seeking to use a ‘War on Terror’ in order to pursue other objectives: Dated 
15 September 2001, four days after 9/11, this report stated: ‘The “regime-
change hawks” in Washington are arguing that a coalition put together for 
one purpose [against international terrorism] could be used to clear up other 
problems in the region’ (Chilcot 3.1: 65; 324). Evidence that action against 
multiple countries was being planned is also indicated in a 20 September 
2001 note from Blair to Bush in which he advised Bush to ‘take our time 
to see whether we could build up the case against Iraq or other countries’ 
before acting’ (Chilcot 3.1: 84; 327). Blair also seems to have been ‘thinking 
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big’ in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, seeing events as an opportunity to 
change the world. The Chilcot report quotes the following line from his 2 
October 2001 Labour Party Conference speech: ‘This is a moment to seize. 
The kaleidoscope has been shaken. The pieces are in flux. Soon they will 
settle again. Before they do, let us re-order this world around us’ (Chilcot 
3.1: 130; 335). Also revealing is the 4 December 2001 memo from Blair to 
Bush in which Blair discusses the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). Here, 
he states that ‘[t]he Middle East is set for catastrophe’ before noting that 
the MEPP needs to be put back on track otherwise it will ‘complicate every-
thing in the Middle East for a wider struggle’ (Blair 2001a) These brief but 
important notes suggest an awareness on the part of Blair that a much wider 
conflict was expected: How else could he have been aware that the Middle 
East was ‘set for catastrophe’?
The remainder of Section 3.1 provides further important indications of 
the planned scope and nature of the ‘War on Terror’. For example, on 17 
September 2001 there was already discussion of Phase 2 of the war on terror-
ism (in which targets would be broadened out from the Phase 1 focus on 
Afghanistan and Bin Laden). Blair’s 4 December 2001 memo, titled ‘The War 
Against Terrorism: the Second Phase’ discusses a total of seven countries (Iraq, 
Philippines, Syria, Iran, Yemen, Somalia and Indonesia) and provides further 
indications of how the ‘War on Terror’ was being conceived. Interestingly, 
this memo provides a clear indication that both Iran and Syria were part of 
discussions concerning military action: Blair cautions ‘If toppling Saddam 
is a prime objective, it is far easier to do it with Syria and Iran in favour or 
acquiescing rather than hitting all three at once’ (Blair 2001a). How many of 
these countries were being targeted for regime change is not clear from the 
documents. However, talk of hitting Iran and Syria, countries not associated 
with the Islamic fundamentalist terrorism understood to have been behind Al 
Qaeda and 9/11, is clearly suggestive of some kind of military action and is 
certainly consistent with actions and events witnessed over the fifteen years 
since 9/11. Moreover, as already noted, the Chilcot report also referenced the 
British embassy cable that observed how the ‘regime-change hawks’ in the 
United States were looking at using the ‘War on Terror’ coalition to ‘clear up 
other problems’ in the region. It seems highly plausible, then, that Syria and 
Iran were being conceived of as potential targets for regime change in the 
immediate aftermath of 9/11.
Importantly, on questions of deception and propaganda, the more broadly 
conceived ‘War on Terror’ was seen as in need of being both covert, i.e. kept 
out of the public eye, and of requiring a significant propaganda campaign. In 
a statement made in a memo to Bush dated 11 October 2001, and in a section 
headed ‘Extending War Aims’, Blair writes:
we know what you want; you can do it; but not whilst you are bomb-
ing Afghanistan. The uncertainty caused by Phase 2 seeming to extend 
to Iraq, Syria etc is really hurting them because it seems to confirm the 
UBL propaganda that this is West vs. Arab. I have no doubt we need 
to deal with Saddam. But if we hit Iraq now, we would lose the Arab 
world, Russia, probably half the EU and my fear is the impact of all that 
on Pakistan. However, I am sure we can devise a strategy for Saddam 
deliverable at a later date. My suggestion is, in order to give ourselves 
space that we say: Phase 1 is the military action focused on Afghanistan 
because it’s where the perpetrators of 11 September hide. Phase 2 is the 
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medium and longer-term campaign against terrorism in all its forms. … 
We just don’t need it debated too freely in public until we know what 
exactly we want to do, and how we can do it. Incidentally, the leaders all 
warned about treating Syria like Iraq. 
(Blair 2001b)
As Bush and Blair were secretly discussing their plans for phase 1 and 2 of 
a wide-ranging ‘War on Terror’, Chilcot indicates that the public line being 
maintained was to downplay the scope of the ‘War on Terror’: Chilcot notes 
MP Ben Bradshaw’s statement that ‘People should not speculate about 
expanding the … campaign beyond Bin Laden and al-Qaeda … There is no 
evidence of any other state involvement … We have always made it clear 
that the military campaign is limited and specific’ (Chilcot 3.1: 215; 349). At 
the same time, both Blair and Manning identified the need for propaganda 
campaigns in order to underpin Phases 1 and 2 of the ‘War on Terror’. In his 
11 October 2001 letter to Bush, Blair stated that ‘[w]e need a dedicated, tightly 
knit propaganda unit for the war generally and for the Arab and Moslem 
world in particular’ (Blair 2001b). More fully, in a letter from David Manning 
to Condoleeza Rice, in a section headed ‘Propaganda’, the basic strategy was 
outlined with a daily ‘message according to the grid pushed out world-wide. 
Specific rebuttal capability set up’. The letter also detailed a set of initiatives 
designed to show how ‘from September 11, good can come for the world, led 
by the US’ (Manning 2001).
Finally, these fascinating insights into, and indications of, a broader geo-
strategic conflict underpinned by the ‘War on Terror’, deception over its 
reach and a propaganda campaign, corroborate two claims made by high-
profile officials. First, the indication of a wider than publicly acknowledged 
‘War on Terror’, including the targeting of countries such as Syria and Iran, 
are consistent with claims made by retired General Wesley Clark (former 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO [1997–2000]). Clark’s state-
ment (made in public on two occasions) was that, shortly after 9/11, he was 
told by a Pentagon official that the United States intended to attack up to 
seven countries. Clark recalls:
He picked up a piece of paper, he said I just got this down from upstairs, 
from the Secretary of Defence’s office today, and he said this is a memo 
that describes how we are gonna take out seven countries in five years, 
starting with Iraq and then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and 
finishing off Iran. 
(Clark 2007a, 2007b)
Second, Blair’s apparent awareness that the Middle East was ‘set for catastro-
phe’ and talk of a shaken ‘kaleidoscope’ and ‘reordering this world’, in addi-
tion to all of the evidence regarding a Phase 1 and 2 of the ‘War on Terror’, 
are consistent with a recent statement by Sir Richard Dearlove, former head 
of MI6. He indicated that Saudi officials were aware of a coming conflict, even 
prior to 9/11. During a speech to the Royal United Services Institute in 2014, 
Dearlove made the following comments:
The second Saudi incident predates 9/11 and it comes from a conversa-
tion with Prince Bandar … and that was, ‘the time is not far off Richard 
in the ME when it will literally be God help the Shia, more than a 
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billion Sunnis have simply had enough of them’ and that was a chilling 
comment which I remember very well indeed. 
(Goodman 2014)
To the extent that these statements are made by officials of the highest status 
and rank, and are consistent with the evidence put into the public domain 
by the Chilcot report, they raise a critical set of questions with regard to both 
the nature and extent of the ‘War on Terror’ and, inevitably, the role of both 
deception and propaganda with respect to the enablement of that war. The 
questions raised, and the research agendas needed to address them, will now 
be discussed in the conclusion.
ConCLusion: reThinKing The ‘wAr on Terror’
On the questions of WMD and the UN route, this paper provides compre-
hensive and conceptually grounded empirical evidence in support of the 
thesis that strategies of deception were pursued (Herring and Robinson 2014a 
and 2014b). With respect to WMD, the conceptual framework indicates a 
pattern of distortions and omissions that led directly to official claims that 
went ‘beyond the bounds of the available intelligence’. With respect to the 
UN route, the evidence from the Chilcot report shows that policy-makers 
actively exaggerated the possibility of a peaceful resolution by misleadingly 
presenting it as a genuine attempt at securing peaceful disarmament, all the 
while developing the strategy primarily as a way of mobilizing support for war 
and gaining legal cover for British military action. There was no evidence of 
self-deception, group think or misperception either with respect to the threat 
from Iraqi WMD or the likelihood of the UN route succeeding. Indeed, it was 
routinely acknowledged that the intelligence on Iraq was weak, that Iraq was 
not an immediate threat and that the UN route was expected/intended to 
fail. Moreover, there is evidence indicating awareness amongst officials that 
they were not engaged in a fair and accurate portrayal of what was going on; 
comments about ‘obscuring the fact that Iraq was not the most serious WMD 
threat’ (emphasis added), going the UN route for ‘optical reasons’ (emphasis 
added) and the need to ‘appear reluctant to use force’ (emphasis added), all 
indicate an intention to disguise the reality of what was going on. Although 
avoiding deception through lying, officials were engaged in deception through 
exaggeration and omission. Chilcot, apparently working with a narrow defini-
tion of deception, whereby it is defined only in terms of lying (i.e. telling of 
falsehoods) thereby excluding deception via omission and distortion, absolves 
Blair of dishonesty. He also avoids assigning responsibility for the use of 
Report X, the critical piece of intelligence which meant that the dossier went 
beyond the bounds of the available intelligence (Butler Inquiry 2004; Chilcot 
Report 2016). However, the evidence he puts into the public domain clearly 
shows officials working hard to manipulate public perceptions of both Iraqi 
WMD capability and threat, as well as the real purpose of the UN route. The 
evidence from Chilcot supports the thesis that these manipulations involved 
deception via distortion/exaggeration and omission, yet on these issues of probity, 
Chilcot remains silent.
Analysis of Section 3.1 of the Chilcot report throws into relief the decep-
tions over WMD and the UN route and provides highly significant new 
evidence regarding the ‘War on Terror’ itself. These propagandistic OPC 
strategies would appear to be only the end product of critical decisions and 
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opportunities seized in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. It was in this period 
that the initial ‘clever’ plan was set out to remove Saddam Hussein through 
a process of ‘softening up’ and pushing the issue of weapons inspections and 
WMD. In this period both Blair and his advisor Manning expressly stated the 
need for a ‘propaganda’ campaign to cover phase 2 of the ‘War on Terror’. 
Moreover, whilst the public and academic perception of the ‘War on Terror’ 
has largely remained focused upon an interpretation of a campaign aimed at 
tackling Islamic fundamentalism, the evidence from Chilcot indicates that, 
in addition, there was a broader geo-strategic vision/campaign formulated 
in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. This involved a regime-change strat-
egy potentially targeting many countries (also indicated by Wesley Clark’s 
claims) which included Syria and Iran, and an awareness of an impending 
catastrophic conflict in the Middle East (also indicated by Dearlove’s claims 
regarding Prince Bandar). Importantly, US and British officials (including Blair 
and Bush) appear to have seen all of this as an opportunity to be exploited, 
not as something to be stopped or contained. Moreover, they make clear 
that the strategy should not be pursued in full view of the public: As such it 
appears to have involved deception through omission.
At a general level, the depth and consequences of these apparently decep-
tive and propagandistic OPC campaigns (multiple wars and massive human 
suffering) demand that scholars devote far more attention to the analysis of 
OPC, deception and propaganda within liberal democratic states. This should 
involve development of the conceptual framework used here and applica-
tion to further cases. It should also include a thorough-going interrogation 
of the institutions, doctrines and practices that lie behind these kinds of OPC 
campaigns, the role of deception as a political strategy, and the consequence 
of all this for our understanding of the state of contemporary democracy. 
Work in this area is the subject of ongoing research by the author and others 
(e.g. Bakir et al, 2017; Miller et al. 2017). More work is needed. 
The Chilcot report also clearly raises new questions about the ‘War on 
Terror’, and ones that have potentially profound implications for our under-
standing of the global role of the West during the last sixteen years. Indeed, the 
initial evidence presented in this paper strongly suggests the need for a major 
expansion of scholarly inquiry into the formative stages of the ‘war on terror’. 
With the materials Chilcot afforded us, this must now include a thorough-
going and critical exploration of the extent to which this global conflict was 
seen as a way of pursuing a geo-strategic agenda aimed at ‘clearing up other 
problems’, projecting power and securing access to key resources, including 
oil. Second, scholarly attention should be paid to the extent to which key Arab 
states, especially Saudi Arabia, might have envisaged a substantial Middle 
East conflict aimed at pursuing regional objectives, and the way in which this 
might have dovetailed with the objectives of the ‘regime change hawks’ in 
Washington. Third, as part of this analysis, close attention needs to be paid to 
the ‘close knit propaganda campaign’ described by Blair in Autumn 2001 and 
the extent to which this might have involved a strategy of deception aimed at 
underpinning multiple aspects of the global ‘War on Terror’ from inception: 
put bluntly, to what extent might have western populations been manipulated into 
support for a war on terrorism that was as much about geo-strategic opportunism 
and aggressive wars, as it was about tackling Islamic fundamentalist terrorism? A 
full and thorough application of the conceptual framework to this period is 
now an urgent task in order to substantiate the indicative evidence presented 
in the final section of this article regarding deceptive OPC and the ‘War on 
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Terror’. Fourth, if it is indeed the case that, in the immediate aftermath of 
9/11, elements within the US government (and perhaps elsewhere) sought to 
take advantage of circumstances in order to either topple or weaken ‘hostile’ 
governments, it is important to assess the extent to which events that we are 
witnessing today (especially the conflicts in Libya, Syria and Yemen) are a 
consequence of the geo-strategic ‘visions’ indicated in both Section 3.1 of the 
Chilcot report and in the claims made by Clark and Dearlove. For example, 
to what extent is the current war in Syria linked directly to United States and 
Saudi (amongst others) ambitions in the region? Given the extraordinary level 
of conflict in the Middle East, which is indeed of the ‘catastrophic’ propor-
tions foretold by Blair back in 2001, it is a matter of great importance and 
relevance to establish both the extent to which current events are traceable 
to these geo-strategic ‘visions’ and the responsibility, indeed culpability, of 
western governments and their key allies for the current conflagration in the 
Middle East.
The last fifteen years have borne witness to multiple violent and destruc-
tive conflicts initiated by the West with the justification of fighting terrorism. 
Governments in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya have been overthrown whilst 
countries such as Syria and Yemen are the sites of protracted and highly 
destructive wars of such scale that, for example, Europe now faces its largest 
refugee crisis since World War II. It is perhaps only now that we are begin-
ning to understand the geo-strategic underbelly of this war and the scale of 
the propaganda exercise needed to mobilize public and political support. It is 
a matter of urgency that much greater intellectual attention is paid to these 
issues.
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